Abstract. In broadcast encryption schemes, a distribution center broadcasts an encrypted message to a subset chosen from a universe of receivers, and only the intended users are able to decrypt the message. Most broadcast encryption schemes do not provide anonymity, and the identities of target receivers are sent in plaintext. However, in several applications, the authorized users' identities have the same sensitivity as the broadcasted messages. Yu, Ren, and Lou (YRL) [Yu, S., Ren, K., and Lou, W. \Attribute-based on-demand multicast group setup with membership anonymity", Computer Networks, 54(3), pp. 377-386 (2010).] considered this issue and introduced an e cient anonymous attribute-based broadcast encryption scheme. This paper rst proposed an attack on the YRL scheme, and showed that the unauthorized receivers could also decrypt the broadcasted message. Next, we proposed the Improved-YRL scheme and proved that it achieved anonymity and semantic security under adaptive corruptions in the chosen ciphertext setting. The proof is provided by the dual system encryption technique and is based on three complexity assumptions in composite order bilinear maps. The Improved-YRL scheme is a step forward in solving the long-standing problem of secure and low overhead anonymous broadcast encryption.
Introduction Broadcast Encryption. The concept of Broadcast
Encryption (BE) [1] is used when a sender wants to send a message to an arbitrary subset chosen from a universe of receivers via an insecure broadcast channel. In this scenario, the distribution center chooses an arbitrary subgroup of receivers, S, encrypts the message due to set S, and broadcasts the ciphertext through the channel. In a secure broadcast encryption scheme, only the legitimate receivers, which belong to set S, can decrypt the received message, while the unauthorized users obtain no information about the message even if they collude. The broadcast encryption schemes are helpful in several applications including TV subscription and electronic learning services [2] in which only the subscribed users who have made a payment to a certain channel or paid to a virtual course could be able to receive the service. Broadcast encryption schemes can also be used for providing access control in encrypted le systems where a le is encrypted so that only users who have access to the le can decrypt it. Copyrighted content protection and group key distribution are also some other potential applications of the broadcast encryption schemes [3] .
Attribute-Based Broadcast Encryption. Since the introduction of broadcast encryption in 1993 by Fiat and Naor [1] , many broadcast encryption schemes have been proposed (see e.g., [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] ). In these schemes, the broadcaster speci es the legitimate receivers individually, while, in real applications, broadcasters often address groups of receivers with the same characteristics. In these scenarios, especially when the number of receivers is large, identifying each individual receiver is impractical. By using Attribute-Based Broadcast Encryption (ABBE), a broadcaster can encrypt a message under a speci ed attribute policy, and only the receivers who own the intended attributes can decrypt the message. In other words, in an ABBE scheme, the target set of receivers S is speci ed by the attributes of its members stated as an access policy. Therefore, the broadcaster has the exibility to encrypt the message, either with or without the identity information of each individual receiver. Several ABBE schemes have been proposed in the literature among which we can refer to [3, [12] [13] [14] [15] .
Anonymous Broadcast Encryption. In the previous broadcast encryption schemes, the authorized receiver needs information about the intended set of receivers S in order to decrypt the ciphertext correctly. Therefore, set S must be transmitted as part of the ciphertext. Hence, all users including the authorized and unauthorized ones will be aware of the authorized set of receivers. This causes important privacy issues; for example, in group key distribution, everyone will know which users and how many of them are involved in a task. In addition, in applications like television broadcasting, the user who has paid a subscription to a certain channel will know who else has paid for that subscription and the user's privacy is violated. To solve this issue, Barth et al. [16] proposed the rst anonymous broadcast encryption scheme. Their scheme protects receivers' identities; however, the number of receivers is leaked by the ciphertext length. In addition, the computation and communication overheads are linear in the number of users. Libert et al. [17] suggested another anonymous broadcast encryption scheme in the standard model with overhead linear in the number of receivers. Schemes [16] and [17] provide full anonymity, meaning that any user, whether he is in set S or not, is unable to obtain information about intended receivers. Outsider anonymity [18] is another de nition that only guarantees the anonymity of intended receivers from the view of users outside of set S. However, users in S can still learn the identities of other legal receivers. Fazio and Perea [18] proposed an outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption scheme with sublinear overheads. The attribute-based anonymous multicast scheme presented by Yu et al. [3] , which we call it the YRL scheme in this paper, suggests a stronger de nition of full anonymity; the scheme not only hides the identities of receivers but also protects the number of intended users. In addition, communication and computation overheads are linear in the number of attributes and are independent of the number of receivers; therefore, the scheme provides high e ciency because of its attribute-based structure. The scheme relies on the notion of Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) and aims to solve the group key distribution problem. Therefore, instead of broadcasting a message M, a group key GK is emitted.
Our contributions. In this paper, we have made the following three main contributions:
We propose an attack on the YRL scheme. This attack shows that all users, including the authorized and unauthorized ones, can decrypt the broadcasted message. Therefore, the YRL scheme is not secure and does not provide the main requirement of broadcast encryption schemes that only the authorized users should be able to decrypt the broadcasted message [19] ;
We develop an enhanced scheme in composite order bilinear groups, called the improved-YRL scheme, which is secure against the proposed attack. We also prove the security of the improved-YRL scheme in the standard model using dual system encryption technique [20] . Our proof is based on the security model for adaptive CCA adversaries proposed in [17] which considers anonymity and indistinguishability in one security game, simultaneously;
We demonstrate that the new scheme retains low overhead and high-performance property of the basic YRL scheme, which means that computation and communication overheads are linear in the number of attributes independent of the number of receivers.
Boneh et al. [6] proposed that \it is a longstanding open problem to build a low-overhead anonymous broadcast encryption system"; therefore, presenting the improved-YRL scheme as an anonymous broadcast encryption scheme with adaptive security and overhead proportional to the number of attributes is an e ort toward solving this open problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the background on bilinear groups and state the access policy used in the YRL scheme. Section 3 concerns the YRL scheme. Section 4 proposes the attack on the YRL scheme. In Sections 5 and 6, we describe our improved-YRL scheme and prove its security, respectively. Section 7 gives the performance evaluation; nally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries 2.1. Bilinear maps
The YRL scheme is based on bilinear maps. Let G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G and e be a bilinear map, e : G G ! G T . The bilinear map e is a function with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: for all u; v 2 G and a; b 2 Z p , e(u a ; v b ) = e(u; v) ab ; 2. Non-degeneracy: e(g; g) 6 = 1, where 1 denotes the identity element of G T ; 3. Computability: There is an e cient algorithm to compute e(u; v) for u; v 2 G.
Composite order bilinear maps
Composite order bilinear maps were rst introduced in [21] . Let G be a group generator algorithm. It takes as input a security parameter, , and outputs a tuple (N = p 1 p 2 p 3 ; G; G T ; e), where p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 are distinct prime numbers, G and G T are multiplicative cyclic groups of composite order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 and e : G G ! G T is a composite order bilinear map. For each p i ; i 2 f1; 2; 3g, let G pi be a subgroup of G of order p i with a generator named as g i . Each T 2 G can be represented as T = X 1 X 2 X 3 where X i 2 G p i is referred to as the \G p i component of G". In addition, for all x; y; z 2 f1; p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 g, G xyz denotes a subgroup of order xyz in G. To generate a random element r 2 G p i , one can set r = g i where is a random element in Z p i .
The main property of composite order bilinear maps is that subgroups G p 1 ; G p 2 ; G p 3 are orthogonal under the bilinear map e, meaning that if h 2 G pi and u 2 G pj for i 6 = j, then e(h; u) = 1. The other properties of composite order bilinear maps are the same as prime order bilinear maps described in Subsection 2.1.
Access policy
Herein, the access policy used in the YRL scheme is reviewed to specify the intended group of receivers [3] . Let n denote the total number of attributes. Each user is assigned an n-element string fAtt i;b j 8i 2 Z n ; b = 0 or 1g such that Att i;0 and Att i;1 show the negative and positive incidents of the i-th attribute, respectively. In other words, the binary sequence X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 can be used to demonstrate the attribute set of each user. In this sequence, the bit`0' implies that the user does not have the corresponding attribute, and the bit`1' shows that the user owns that attribute.
The access policy is demonstrated using AND logic. For example, (Att 3;1^A tt 1;0 ) or X 3 X 1 is used for showing the access policy for the users with the 3rd attribute and do not possess the 1st attribute. Here, X 2 is don't-care, i.e., for this access policy, it is not important what the value of X 2 is.
The YRL Scheme
The YRL scheme [3] relies on the notion of CiphertextPolicy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) in which the intended subset of users, S, is speci ed with the access policy, T . In the YRL scheme, access policy T is not broadcasted along with the ciphertext, and the authorized users can decrypt the received messages without knowing the access structure. In this way, the scheme can provide the anonymity of users. The scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encryption, and Decryption. The scheme is reviewed in the following. Setup (; X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 ) ! (P P; MK): The input parameters of the setup algorithm include security parameter, , and the attribute set of each user, X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 , and the outputs include public parameters, P P , and Master Key, MK, generated as follows. Due to security parameter, , the algorithm chooses a group, G, of prime order, p, with generator, g. Each attribute in vector X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 is mapped to one of the members of G. Consider that attribute (
The parameters (g; ; ; h i; Xi ) are de ned in the setup algorithm, above. In addition, r is a random element chosen from Z p .
Encryption (GK; T; MK) ! CT : In order to distribute the group key GK, the broadcaster rst encrypts GK using this algorithm. The input parameters of the Encryption algorithm include GK, access policy T , and master key, MK = ( ; ; fa i ; b i g 8i2Z n ); the output is the ciphertext CT = (C; C; fĈ j g j=0;1 ; fC i g 8i2Zn ). The rst component of CT is in the form ofC = (GK k MAC):X, where X is a blinding factor to hide the value (GK k MAC). The other three components of the ciphertext are used to construct X and obtain GK. In the last component, each C i is generated corresponding to the i-th bit of the attribute set, X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 , through steps 1 to 4: Decryption (CT; X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 ; SK) ! (GK or?):
Each authorized group member, GM, runs this algorithm to obtain the group key GK. The inputs of this algorithm include the ciphertext, the attribute set, X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 , and the secret key of the GM. The output is GK or ? depending on whether the attribute set of the GM satis es the access structure or not. The decryption procedure is as follows: 1. For j = 0; 1; B j = e(Ĉ j ; D) = e(g k j = ; g r ) = e(g; g) rkj is calculated. Then, for each bit X i of the user's attribute set, X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 , the value F i corresponding to X i is computed using C i = (g s i ; C i;0 ; C i;1 ) through Eq. (4). 
In Eq. (4), if X i 2 T , t i 6 = 0; otherwise, t i = 0.
2. F is computed by multiplying the values of F i :
e(g; g) r i s i e(g; h i;X i ) rt i = e(g; g) r e(g; g) rx 0 ;
where x 0 2 Z p is de ned in Eq. (6):
Therefore, according to the properties of bilinear maps, we will have:
e(g; h i;Xi ) rt i = e(g; g) rx 0 :
Eq. (7) is used to calculate the value of F in Eq. (5).
If the GM's attributes satisfy the access policy, x 0 will be equal to x. Otherwise, the probability of x 0 being equal to x will be negligible (note that x has been de ned in the Encryption algorithm as g x = Q 8j;X j 2T h 
Then, the user checks whether the hash value of the rst part of M 0 is equal to its second part or not. If the user is a member of the target subset, x 0 will be equal to x; as a result, the hash value of the rst part will be equal to the second part. Thus, the user obtains the correct GK. Otherwise, the user is unauthorized and cannot obtain GK.
As can be seen, in the YRL scheme, access structure, T , is not sent along with the ciphertext and the authorized users are able to decrypt the received message without knowing the access structure. As a result, the authorized user, after decryption, does not know which attributes or how many of them make the message accessible to him. In addition, he is not aware of the membership of other users in the subset or even the number of authorized users. Therefore, not only the unauthorized users but also the authorized ones are not able to obtain any information about the access structure, and the YRL scheme provides the anonymity property.
Yu et al. [3] also claimed that their introduced scheme was secure. It means that a user can obtain the correct GK i his attributes satisfy the access policy. However, no proof is provided for neither anonymity nor security in their paper. In the next section, we propose an attack, which violates the security of the YRL scheme.
Attack on the YRL scheme
Herein, we demonstrate that the claim that a user can obtain GK i he holds all the attributes required by the access policy, is not true; further to that, all of the users, including authorized and unauthorized ones, can decrypt the received message. Assume that user u with secret key SK u has received a broadcasted ciphertext CT . As mentioned in Section 3, the secret key SK u and the ciphertext CT are computed as follows: 
Now, user u can decrypt the ciphertext using his secret key through the following procedure:
e(D; C) = e(g ( +r)= ; g s 0 ) = e(g; g) ( +r)s 0 :
2. Calculates e(g; g) rs 0 : As mentioned in the Decryption algorithm, s 0 satis es the equation:
however, after that, C i;0 and C i;1 were updated to new values, C i;0 = g k0 C i;0 ; and C i;1 = g k1 C i;1 . Since C i = (g s i ; C i;0 ; C i;1 ), user u can compute Q n 1 i=0 C i;0 C i;1 by using C i s:
Therefore:
e(g n(k0+k1) g s 0 ;D) = e(g n(k0+k1) g s 0 ; g r ) = e(g s 0 ; g r )e(g n(k 0 +k 1 ) ; g r ) = e(g; g) rs 0 e(g; g) rn(k 0 +k 1 ) :
Furthermore, we have:
B j = e(Ĉ j ; D) = e(g k j = ; g r ) = e(g; g) rk j ; j = 0; 1 ! B 0 :B 1 = e(g; g) r(k0+k1) :
Thus, using Eqs. (12) and (13), the user u can obtain e(g; g) rs 0 as follows:
(12) (13) n = e(g; g) rs 0 e(g; g) rn(k0+k1) (e(g; g) r(k 0 +k 1 ) ) n = e(g; g) rs 0 :
3. Computes e(g; g) s 0 by dividing the result of the rst step of the attack, e(g; g) ( +r)s 0 , by the result of the second step, e(g; g) rs 0 .
e(g; g) ( +r)s 0 e(g; g) rs 0 = e(g; g) s 0 :
4. Finally, user u can obtain GK as follows:
e(g; g) s 0 = (GK k MAC): (16) Therefore, this user, regardless of what his set of attributes is, can obtain GK. This shows that the YRL scheme is not secure and does not provide the main requirement of a broadcast encryption scheme that only the intended users should be able to decrypt the broadcasted message.
Improved-YRL scheme
In this section, we improve the YRL scheme in order to remove its weakness and make it secure against the proposed attack in Section 4. The update procedure of C i;0 and C i;1 is the vulnerability point of the YRL scheme. As mentioned before, for all i 2 Z n , the broadcaster uses xed values k 0 ; and k 1 for updating C i;0 and C i;1 to new values C i;0 = g k0 C i;0 ; and C i;1 = g k 1 C i;1 . Therefore, e( Q n 1 i=0 C i;0 C i;1 ;D) has a xed term e(g; g) rn(k 0 +k 1 ) which can be omitted using the termĈ j in the ciphertext. As a result, e(g; g) rs 0 and e(g; g) s 0 are obtained which help the attacker to obtain GK. Hence, in order to x this weakness, we randomize the update process and eliminate the third term in both the ciphertext and secret key. In addition, in order to propose a security proof, the Improved-YRL scheme is based on composite order bilinear maps. In what follows, the improved-YRL scheme is describe in detail: Setup (; X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 ) ! (P P; MK): The input parameters of the setup algorithm include security parameter, , and the attribute set of each user, X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 , and the outputs are public parameters, P P , and master key, MK, which are generated as follows. Due to security parameter, , the algorithm selects a cyclic group, G, of composite order, N = p 1 The parameters (g 1 ; ; ; h i; X i ) are de ned in the setup algorithm above. Therefore, it is the same as the YRL's KeyGen algorithm except that the third term D = g r is omitted and D i s are the members of G p1p3 .
Encryption (GK; T; MK) ! CT : As before, The inputs are group key, GK, access policy, T , and master key, MK; the output is the ciphertext CT . However, this algorithm has some di erences with the YRL's Encryption algorithm. The rst di erence is the procedure for updating the values of C i;0 and C i;1 , and the second one omit the term fĈ j = g k j = g j=0;1 from the ciphertext because the decryption successfully works without it. In addition, g is turned into g 1 ; therefore, the rst term in C i is g s i 1 2 G p 1 ; because h i;Xi is an element of G p1p3 as stated in the setup algorithm, C i;0 and C i;1 are elements of G p1p3 , too. Therefore, the ciphertext:
is generated as follows: The last equality holds due to the orthogonality property of composite order bilinear maps.
Decryption (CT; X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 ; SK) ! (GK or?):
The inputs of this algorithm include the ciphertext, the attribute set X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 , and the private key of a GM; in addition, its output is GK or ? depending on whether the GM's attribute set satis es the access structure or not. In this algorithm, the rst step of the basic YRL's Decryption algorithm for calculating B j is omitted. In addition, F i s are computed in a simpler way: 1. For each bit, X i , of the GM's attribute set, X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 , F i is computed through Eq. 
x 0 satis es Eq. (21) where only G p1 part of h j;Xj is considered:
If the GM's attributes satisfy the access policy, then we will have:
Otherwise, the probability of x 0 = x or k = 0 will be negligible. 
Then, each user veri es whether the hash value of the rst part of M 0 is equal to its second part or not. If the user is a member of the target group, this equality will be obtained because x = x 0 and k = 0. Otherwise, the user is unauthorized and cannot obtain the correct value of GK.
In the next section, we will analyze the security of the proposed scheme, and prove that it achieves both indistinguishability and anonymity in the standard model.
Security analysis
This section begins by explaining why the proposed attack in Section 4 would not succeed on the Improved-YRL construction. Then, in order to prove the security of the proposed scheme, we will formally de ne the exact security de nition in Subsection 6.1. Next, we state the complexity assumptions in composite order bilinear groups and present the proof in Subsections 6.2 and 6.3, respectively. Lemma 1. The Improved-YRL scheme is secure against the proposed attack in Section 4.
Proof. The attack process involves computing the equation of Q n 1 i=0 C i;0 C i;1 = g kr 1 :g s 0 1 R 3 , where k r is the sum of all k i values used for updating C i;0 and C i;1 in the update phase of the improved-YRL scheme. k r is completely random and unpredictable because there is no term in the ciphertext containing information about it. Therefore, the attacker will not be able to obtain e(g 1 ; g 1 ) rs 0 , and the blinding factor, e(g 1 ; g 1 ) s 0 , and the attack will not work.
Security de nitions
In this section, a model is de ned for the anonymous broadcast encryption with CCA security against adaptive adversaries. This model is a modi cation of the security model de ned in [17] .
De nition 1. ANO-IND-CCA security game for a broadcast encryption scheme, BE, is as follows.
Setup. Challenger De nition 2. A broadcast encryption scheme, BE, is said to be anonymous and indistinguishable against CCA adversaries or is ANO-IND-CCA secure if any PPT adaptive CCA adversary has at most a negligible advantage in the above security game.
Complexity assumptions
In what follows, we state three complexity assumptions in composite order bilinear groups which we will rely on to prove the security of the improved-YRL scheme. Rao and Dutta [22] closely followed [23] 
Security proof
Here we use a technique called dual system encryption [20] to prove the security of improved-YRL scheme in the ANO-IND-CCA security game described in Subsection 6.1. In a dual system, ciphertexts and secret keys can be either normal or semi-functional. Semi-functional terms are not part of the real system; however, they are only used in the security proof. A normal secret key, can decrypt both normal and semifunctional ciphertexts; however, a semi-functional secret key can only decrypt normal ciphertexts. In other words, one would fail to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext using a semi-functional secret key. The semifunctional ciphertexts and secret keys for improved-YRL are de ned as below. 26) where is chosen randomly from Z N and in C i 0 = C i g 2 =n , only the terms C i;0 ; and C i;1 are multiplied by g 2 =n . In addition, n is the number of attributes, and is a part of master key as stated before.
Semi-functional secret key. To compute a semifunctional secret key for a user with the attribute set X n 1 X n 2 :::X 0 , we rst run the algorithm KeyGen to 
where is a random element in Z N and e i = a i if h i; x i = g a i 1 X 3 and e i = b i if h i; x i = g b i 1 X 3 . Security is proved using a sequence of games, which are proven to be indistinguishable under assumptions given in Section 6.2. Considering q as the maximum number of secret key queries an adversary can make, the sequence of games is as follows:
Game ANO IND CCA : In this game as described in Section 6.1, all ciphertexts and secret keys are normal; Game 0 : Herein, the challenge ciphertext is semifunctional; however, all secret keys are normal; Game k (1 k q): In this game, in addition to the challenge ciphertext, the rst k queried secret keys are semi functional, and the rest of them are normal. Therefore, in Game q , all the secret keys would be semi-functional; Game final : This game is the same as Game q except that the ciphertext is randomized. Therefore, the challenge ciphertext is independent of the group keys and access policies given by the adversary in the challenge step.
The sequence of hybrid games in the proof are related as follows: Proof. B is given (ỹ; g 1 ; g 3 ; X 1 X 2 X 3 ; Y 1 Y 2 ; T ). It will simulate Game k 1 or Game k depending on whether T is an element of G p 1 or is an element of G p 1 p 2 .
We now describe how B interacts with A to break 
where e i is as de ned above. It can be seen that if
SK k is a semi-functional secret key.
Finally, for SK j ; k+1 j q, B simply generates a normal secret key.
In addition, in response to A's decryption requests (CT; Att i ), B generates the normal secret key corresponding to Att i , and decrypts CT using Decryption algorithm.
Challenge. A sends B two equal length group keys and two access policies T 0 and T 1 Setup. B chooses random 2 Z N , and for each element of the attribute set, it chooses a i ; and b i randomly from Z p 1 and keeps master key, MK = ( ; fa i ; b i g 8i2Z n ). Herein, B cannot choose parameter himself, because this parameter is given to him via the term g 1 X 2 . However, it can be easily shown that normal ciphertext and secret keys can be generated using the term g 1 X 2 , without having directly. 
where e i is as de ned in Lemma 3.
In addition, in response to A's decryption requests (CT; Att i ), B generates the normal secret key corresponding to Att i , and decrypts CT using the Decryption algorithm. Proof. We have shown in the previous lemmas that Game ANO IND CCA is indistinguishable from Game final . In Game final , the adversary receives no information about b information theoretically and the chance of any adversary in guessing the true b is exactly 1=2. Therefore, this is true in Game ANO IND CCA and the adversary cannot guess which GK is encrypted and also cannot obtain any information about access structure from the ciphertext with a probability greater than 1=2. Therefore, the improved-YRL scheme has both indistinguishability and anonymity and the proof is completed.
Performance evaluation 7.1. Overhead analysis
This subsection analyzes the performance of the proposed scheme. For this aim, the computation, communication, and storage overheads are calculated in terms of the total number of attributes in the network, which is denoted by n. [3] , improved-YRL's setup has a term 2nExp:cmp. In addition, as in the improved-YRL's setup, some elements of subgroup G 1 are multiplied by some elements of subgroup G 3 , and then the extra term 2nMul:cmp is added. Therefore, the total overhead of the improved-YRL's setup is 2nExp:cmp + 2nMul:cmp. In the KeyGen algorithm, the term g r is eliminated in comparison with KeyGen algorithm of the YRL scheme. Therefore, the computation overhead of the KeyGen algorithm is (n + 2)Exp:cmp. In the Encryption algorithm, the terms g k 0 and g k 1 are eliminated. Therefore, in comparison with the Encryption algorithm of the YRL scheme, two Exp computations are omitted and the resulting computation overhead is reduced to (3n + 1)Exp:cmp. In the Decryption algorithm, there is no need to compute fB j = e(g k j ; g r )g j2f0;1g ; consequently, the total number of pairing computations is reduced by two units. Therefore, the total computation overhead of Decryption algorithm becomes nMul:cmp + (n + 2)P air:cmp. These results are summarized in Table 1 
7.2. Discussion and comparison Table 2 compares the overheads of our scheme with the basic YRL scheme [3] and two other anonymous broadcast encryption schemes [16, 17] , as discussed in the Introduction Section. In this table, parameters n and N denote the number of the attributes and number of the intended receivers, respectively. As in Table 2 , the computation, communication, and storage overheads of the improved-YRL scheme, the same as the basic YRL scheme, are linear in the number of attributes, and independent of the number of receivers. Therefore, improved-YRL not only enjoys enhanced and provable security in comparison to basic YRL [3] and resists the proposed attack in this paper, but also preserves low overhead and high-performance properties of the basic YRL scheme. Furthermore, a comparison between the proposed scheme and two selected anonymous broadcast encryption schemes [16, 17] demonstrates that our scheme is much more e cient. That is, as can be seen in Table 2 , the computation (encryption and decryption time) and communication overheads of both [16] and [17] grow linearly with regard to the number of the intended receivers. In this case, if 1024 bit RSA algorithm for encryption is used, then the ciphertext size will be 1024N, where N is the total number of receivers. This implies a huge computation and communication overhead in the large-scale systems. Since the attributes are usually shared by the unlimited number of group members, it can be seen that in the case of large-scale applications, the computation and communication overheads of the improved YRL scheme, which are linear in the number of attributes, can be well controlled. In fact, in systems with largescale structures, the number of the required attributes in comparison to the total number of users could be signi cantly small. In addition to better e ciency, the proposed scheme suggests stronger anonymity, that is, our scheme not only hides the identities of receivers, but also protects the number of intended receivers. In [16] and [17] , the number of intended receivers is not protected.
Besides, according to [3] , in order to minimize the communication overhead in a limited bandwidth environment such as wireless networks, or to minimize the computation overhead in resource-constrained receivers, there are di erent implementations of bilinear pairings. Depending on the application, the appropriate implementation should be chosen for minimizing the communication/computation overhead in practice.
Conclusion and future work
In this study, we investigated an anonymous broadcast encryption scheme, called YRL scheme and showed its vulnerability. Our investigation demonstrated that all of the users in this scheme, including authorized and unauthorized ones, could decrypt the received message. Thus, the YRL scheme did not provide the main requirement of the broadcast encryption schemes.
Since the introduction of an anonymous, e cient and provably secure broadcast encryption scheme is one of the most important open problems in this eld, the YRL scheme in composite order bilinear groups was improved, making it secure against the proposed attack. We also proved anonymity and semantic security of the improved-YRL scheme under adaptive corruptions in the chosen ciphertext setting.
The same as the basic YRL, the computation and communication overheads of the improved-YRL scheme, as illustrated in Table 1 , are O(n), where n is the number of attributes and independent of the number of receivers. Since the attributes are usually shared by the unlimited number of group members, the scheme is more e cient than the anonymous broadcast encryption schemes with overheads related to the number of receivers [17] .
Furthermore, presenting a real-world application of the proposed scheme, e.g., secure and scalable ehealth architectures and secure cloud storage systems, can be considered as an interesting future work. 
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